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Abstract 
This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can 
implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of 
payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to 
manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate 
against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient 
allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against 
the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social 
preferences of the manager also explain the choice of the option. However, the decision process and 
the managerial style based on self-reported attitudes have little influence on the choice of allocation. 
This is consistent with employee satisfaction essentially depending on the payoff and not being 
sensible to the process. 
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1. Introduction 
Effective management is considered by many scholars to be a science as well as an art that requires a 
subtle mix of technical skills, soft skills, good intuition, and high moral values (see for instance 
Lilienthal, 1967, Mintzberg, 1973; 1975; Solomon, 1993; Drucker, 2001; Kotter, 2001). The 
complexity of the problems to be decided, the uncertainty surrounding them and the associated ethical 
tensions all prompt managers to draw heavily on their own personality traits in making decisions. A 
substantial amount of the leadership theory literature has taken stock of these basic facts and strived to 
identify distinctive management styles, which has led to a proliferation of typologies (e.g., Levin, 
1940; Vroom, 2000; Northouse, 2011, Sauer, 2011; Bockerman et al., 2012; see for a survey Anderson 
and Sun, 2017). 
However, the research in experimental economics has developed around extremely stylized 
choices that focus on simple individual decisions or simple interactions, more so in the controlled 
environment of the lab than in field experiments. To quote Friedman, Cassar and Selten (2004), “an 
experiment actively engages some small piece of the world. We design and run an experiment and 
record the results to learn about that piece.” The complexity of managerial decisions and the high level 
of decision aggregation would therefore indicate against using lab experiments to study this topic. 
However, lab experiments bring the invaluable benefit of a controlled environment where causality 
can be detected. Consequently, several management scholars have called for the use of experimental 
methods to study managerial issues. For instance, Powel et al. (2011) wrote the following: 
“Nonetheless, behavioral economics and behavioral finance have led the way in generating new ideas 
and research methods and in building intellectual bridges with psychology and neuroscience. We 
believe behavioral strategy can do the same in strategic management.” This call was echoed by Foss et 
al. (2016) who suggest that experiments can help develop better micro-foundations for strategy. As 
emphasized by Croson et al. (2007), while lab experiments can never be a substitute for the traditional 
methods of analysis in management, based on observational data; they can be a worthy complement 
since (1) they can be useful in distinguishing among competing theories, and (2) help “for theory 
building in corporate strategy, suggesting modifications to existing disciplinary-based theories and 
exploring new theoretical directions efficiently”. 
This paper aims to contribute to the emerging behavioral management research literature by 
studying, in the controlled environment of the lab, how business students make an elementary 
decision. The study further seeks to ensure that the essential features of the managerial context are 
represented in the experiment, including the possible manipulation of information by the manager and 
his/hers strategic choice with regard to the degree of team involvement. We implement the standard 
methodology in experimental economics: (1) by avoiding participant deception by providing them 
with a fully transparent set of instructions, and (2) paying subjects in cash depending on their choices 
to ensure the salience of the decisions; furthermore (3), anonymity was strictly enforced (Davis and 
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Holt, 1993; Friedman et al. 2004). The cash incentives also add a degree of realism to the experiment 
since the vast majority of managerial decisions have material consequences for companies and their 
stakeholders. 
Figure 1 summarizes the key elements of the experiment, expressing the outcome (the decision) 
at the juncture between the personal characteristics of the person including tolerance to risk, inequality 
aversion and style of management, the available decision processes, and his or her ability and 
willingness to manipulate information. 
Management involves a permanent stream of very diverse decisions. The traditional 
management literature used to emphasize that many top manager decisions are oriented toward value 
creation and resource optimization by the company. As stated by Porter and Millar (1985), “This 
optimization may require tradeoffs. For example, a more costly product design and more expensive 
raw materials can reduce after-sale service costs. A company must resolve such trade-offs, in 
accordance with its strategy, to achieve competitive advantage.” Since the early 1990s, companies 
have become increasingly concerned about their social and environmental footprint; thus, the scope of 
decisions and associated trade-offs have broadened in scope. Indeed, managerial decisions have a 
direct impact on people. They certainly have a bearing on the organization’s main stakeholders such as 
its shareholders, employees, customers, collectivities. As noted by Burnett (2019), these main 
stakeholders provide positive and negative feedback on managerial decisions. For instance, 
shareholders can review a manager’s compensation, customers can shun a firm’s products or provide 
good press, and employees can support or oppose decisions by adjusting their effort level. Beyond the 
main stakeholders, a company’s activities and choices can have consequences for society at large. In 
the last few years, large companies seem to be increasingly concerned about doing good in general. 
Therefore, the nature of the decision selected for the current study is of utmost importance for 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn. Managers in “real” firms must implement a wide set of decisions 
related to the prices, product quality and innovation strategies of the firm with regard to areas such as 
the making of alliances, partnerships, hiring, training and compensation policies, and corporate social 
responsibility. The set of choices can be discrete – for instance, whether to the launch a new product – 
or continuous – for instance, what the share of the communication budget should be in the year to 
come. All these choices involve various tradeoffs and tensions.  
In our experiment, we will consider the traditional trade-off between “efficiency” and “equity” 
to which managers are quite often submitted. This tradeoff is an essential component of the modern 
debate about the social role of the firm. From a methodological perspective, distributional choices are 
interesting since they are easy for the participants to understand and easy to measure, which make 
them good candidates for lab experiments. In the lab, the stakeholders can best be seen as the firm’s 
employees, whose payoffs are directly related to the manager’s decision. Such a measure can involve 
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factors such as the reorganization of the production process with worker reallocation. Depending on 
the decision process (to be selected by the manager), employees can influence the decision. 
Furthermore, in some treatments, employees will be allowed to retaliate against a decision that they 
dislike. Thus, the manager should aim to anticipate all possible reactions and make the “best” decision 
given his or her expectations for stakeholder feedback. 
 
Figure 1. Key elements of the experimental design 
 
Furthermore, the tensions between a manager’s own goals and stakeholder interests can be 
resolved or amplified through the decision process. The critical element of the managerial decision is 
not the decision itself but the choice of the process that allows for the implementation of the preferred 
choice in the best possible way for all participants. We will let the manager choose the decision 
process among a set of stereotypical processes that mimic real life processes.
3
 Related to the decision 
process, managers will quite often exploit their information advantage with respect to stakeholders. 
The power of the CEO to set the agenda will be introduced in the experiment by allowing the 
participants to disclose only bits of information (about the payoff distribution). 
                                                     
3
 Economists prefer to focus on the principal-agent contract, including the manager’s compensation scheme. 
Because the manager’s goals can diverge from the owners’ goals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), in an imperfect 
information setting, the incentive compatibility constraint will provide the most efficient managers with an 
informational rent (Laffont and Martimort, 2009; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). We do not address here this 
topic; in the experiment, the manager has a direct incentive to choose the most efficient solution. 
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What is interesting in managerial decisions, and which is also a feature of our experiment, is 
that the preferences with regard to outcomes and processes are not independent. In other words, a 
given preference with regard to options can prompt a manager to choose a given process, and yet the 
process can have an impact on the final outcome, which might differ from the ex-ante preferred 
choice. To be sure, the manager will choose the process that maximizes the likelihood that the 
preferred outcome will be obtained at the least cost to him or her. In this experiment, the manager will 
first choose the amount of information he or she will disclose and the decision process; then the 
manager will use these factors to push for implementation of the preferred option among the set of 
feasible allocations. 
Our design data will allow us to test several assumptions:  
a) When given the choice between an efficient/inegalitarian allocation and an 
inefficient/egalitarian allocation, students in business administration should prefer the 
former. 
b) The manager will more often respond to the threat of retaliation by making the decision 
that will satisfy the decision-bearers. 
c) When making a decision that the manager perceives as unpopular and against which the 
decision-bearers might retaliate, he or she should avoid the discretionary choice, and 
may also avoid the majority vote since his or her control over the outcome will be 
weaker. 
d) A manager who is subject to shame and guilt will hide information when making 
unpopular choices. 
e) Management styles will impact the decision process. 
f) Employee satisfaction depends on payoffs and on the method of imposing the decision. 
In general, experimental economic studies can be criticized for their limited external validity, 
and this criticism is amplified by the nature of the topic under scrutiny; managerial problems are 
extremely difficult due to the complexity of the environment and the endemic uncertainty. Therefore, 
decisions are driven by a subtle combination of skills, moral values and intuition under the pressure of 
the time and subject to emotions related to status, competition and ultimately the survival of the firm. 
Is it possible to learn anything about managerial decisions from a lab experiment that requires 
dramatic simplifications to be implemented? A few management scholars have already taken up this 
challenge. 
The behavioral management literature is expanding steadily, and it goes beyond the purpose of 
this short paper to provide an exhaustive survey. As relevant examples, such studies include reporting 
on managerial decisions in lab experiments under monopolistic competition such as pricing or 
excessive market entry (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999, Iyer, 2015; Levine et al., 2017; Artinger and 
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Powell, 2015) or decision errors due to bounded rationality (Shapira and Shaver, 2014). Several papers 
have analyzed performance (Sterman, 1989; Apesteguia et al., 2012; Lamiraud and Vranceanu, 2018) 
in mass-attendance business games or the consequences of psychological biases such as optimism and 
overconfidence in explaining “abnormal” managerial choices (Kosegi, 2014).  
Closer to our study, Kocher et al. (2012) use experimental data to show that managers who 
prefer efficiency are more likely to exercise an autocratic management style. Boulu-Reshef et al. 
(2015) analyze the relationship between leadership style, leadership communication and organizational 
performance in a lab experiment. Billinger and Rosenbaum (2019) analyze how managerial discretion 
over a firm’s resources and output can foster worker cooperation. 
Our paper also contributes to the substantial body of literature in experimental economics as 
applied to social preferences. Experiments with the most celebrated dictator game reveal that people 
have a feeling of fairness and will retaliate against a decision-maker who offers them less than he or 
she will keep for him- or herself. Many theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
1998) and experiments (inter alia, Charness, and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Falk et al., 
2008) have confirmed what common intuition has already suggested: while people are self-interested, 
they are also concerned about the payoffs of the others. Many people seem to dislike situations in 
which their payoff is smaller or larger than the payoff of their partner. In our paper, the subjects with a 
strong preference for equality will, more often than others, avoid an efficient decision. In addition, the 
fear of retaliation (allowed in some treatments) is also a powerful factor that dissuades them from 
implementing an efficient solution.  
The design of the experiment required many simplifying assumptions, some of which are more 
harmful than the others. Specifically, by focusing on one decision at a given moment, the experiment 
does not allow for the investigation of the intertemporal dimension of managerial choices, including a 
reputation building factor and the dynamic of adjustments to externals shocks, which can make an 
organization resilient or fragile. However, in one treatment, the employees can retaliate against a 
decision that they disapprove; thus, the experiment allows for a simple form of strategic interaction. 
Learning processes, which are extremely important in organizations, have also been neglected. Using 
students in business administration instead of “genuine” managers can also create a selection bias 
since those who will become top-level decision-makers are only a subset of the population used for the 
analysis, and, with time and experience, their skills can also evolve. Despite its limitations, the 
experiment shows that experiments can provide a useful methodology for unveiling the micro-
foundations of managerial decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the design of the experiment. 
Section 3 presents the results, and section 4 provides our conclusions. 
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1. Design of the experiment 
All subjects were recruited from the student population of the Burgundy Business School in Dijon, 
France. As a "French Grande Ecole", BSB students are selected through a demanding national 
examination. This group is relatively homogenous in terms of cognitive abilities, age and educational 
background. The gender distribution is balanced. A large majority will find jobs after graduation in the 
private sector (in areas such as consulting and auditing, banking, finance and insurance, marketing).
4
 
The experimental sessions were organized at the experimental lab of the school, the LESSAC, 
in October 2018, with a total of 477 subjects. The subjects were seated in cubicles. They made their 
decisions on a computer screen and could not establish eye contact with one another. The instructions 
(provided in the Appendix 2) and data collection were computerized.
5
 A typical experimental session 
lasted for approximately one hour; subjects earned 12 euros on average. 
The experiment is organized as a game between three agents. Agent 1 represents the manager; 
agents 2 and 3 can be seen as representing the firm’s two employees. Agent 1 must first choose a 
decision process and then make a decision that bears material consequences for all three of them. 
Specifically, the manager (Agent 1) must choose between Option A and Option B. In Option A, the 
payoffs are (4, 4, 4), respectively: all agents receive 4 euros. In Option B, Agent 1 receives 6 euros. 
With a 0.5 probability, Agent 2 receives 8 euros, and Agent 3 receives 2 euros. The opposite allocation 
is implemented with a probability of 0.5, Agent 2 receives 2 euros, and Agent 3 receives 8 euros. 
Option B is thus (6, 8 or 2, 2 or 8). With this payoff structure, Option A is “fair” or egalitarian, as all 
persons in the group receive the same amount whereas B is “unfair” or inegalitarian since there is a 
positive variance between the individual payoffs. However, Option B is “efficient” as the total gain 
(6+8+2) exceeds the total gain in Option A (4+4+4). The ex-ante efficiency is greater considering the 
cumulated payoff of the 3 agents as well as at the type level: in the efficient allocation, not only does 
the manager earn more than in the egalitarian allocation (6>4), but so do the employees as a group 
(8+2 > 4+4). 
 
Option A Option B 
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 
4 4 4 6 2/8* 8/2* 
Legend * - Probability 0.5 to get the low/high payoff 
Table 1: The structure of payoffs 
 
                                                     
4
 See the annual report of the accreditation organization Conférence des Grandes Ecoles for the employability of 
business school students in France in 2018 (CGE 2018). 
5
 The computer program was developed by Delphine Dubart at the ESSEC Experimental Lab using z-Tree 
(Fichbacher, 2007). 
8 
 
This structure of payoffs provides agent 1 (the manager) with an incentive to choose the 
efficient option B. If, instead, he or she chooses A, this could be explained either by fear of retaliation 
by the agent who will receive the low payoff or by a strong aversion to inequality. 
The experiment allows managers to choose one of three decision processes that can be ordered 
from the most autocratic to the most democratic and involve different degrees of engaging employees 
in the decision-making. 
 Explain then chose. Agent 1 can use a chat box to justify his or her choice and then 
decide by him- or herself which of Option A or B he or she will implement; a genuinely 
autocratic manager would probably adopt this method; 
 Listen then chose. Agent 1 can open a chat box for the employees and observe what 
they write to each other, without interacting. The chat box stays open for 2 minutes. At 
the end of the discussion time, Agent 1 choses between Option A and B. 
 Majority vote. Agent 1 can implement a democratic choice process: he or she invites 
the two employees to cast a vote in favor of A or B, and, at the same time, he or she 
casts his or her own vote; the Option that receives at least 2/3 of the votes wins. The 
percent of votes in favor of each option is not communicated. In this latter process, the 
manager’s control over the final outcome is weaker insofar as two votes against his or 
her decision would defeat it. 
In the “Listen then chose” process, we read and manually coded the options that appeared to be 
preferred by the employees as “preference for A”, “preference for B” or “no consensus”.  
The previous choice of a process (a, b or c) and of an option (A or B) will be implemented 
within four different treatments in a standard 2x2 design. The subjects who participated in one 
treatment cannot participate in another. Two conditions vary based on the amount of information that 
the managers can disclose to the employees. 
One condition varies the ability of the employees to react to the decision process and its 
outcome at the very last stage of the game. In the “No sanction” setting, the employees have no option 
to impose sanctions on the manager. In the “Sanction possible” case, at the end of the experiment, the 
employees can impose a costly penalty on the manager. The penalty can be any amount between 0 and 
2 euros. Each euro of penalty will cost the employee 0.25 euros; because of this cost, the penalty can 
be interpreted as a measure of the subject’s dissatisfaction with the decision. The no-sanction 
treatment is of course less realistic because, in general, stakeholders can retaliate; the purpose of 
including a no-sanction treatment is to provide us with a measure of the effect of the threat on the 
manager’s behavior.  
The other condition varies the payoff information available to managers and employees. In the 
“full information” setting, the payoffs are common knowledge to both the manager and the employees: 
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the manager has no control with regard to the information about the payoffs. In the “asymmetric 
information” treatment, only the manager knows about the payoffs: he or she decides whether to hide 
the payoffs from employees in Option A, in Option B or in none of them. No decision can be made if 
no information at all is disclosed; thus, we ruled out this possibility.  
The four main treatments are presented in Table 2, in which we also indicate the distribution of 
managers (agents 1) by main treatments. There were 93 agent 1s in the asymmetric information setting 
and 66 in the full information setting. There were 52 agent 1s in the no-sanction setting, and there 
were 107 remaining in the with-sanction setting. 
 
 Sanction not 
allowed 
Sanction allowed  Total 
Asymmetric information  39 54 93 
Full information 13 53 66 
Total 52 107 159 
Table 2. Main treatments and number of agent 1s in each treatment. 
 
At the end of the experimental session, we use two incentivized tasks to elicit risk and 
inequality aversion.  
Since the main experiment relied on a relatively complex design, we used the risk aversion task 
developed by Eckel and Grossman (2008), which distinguishes itself from other standard tasks by its 
simple structure. The participants are asked to make ten choices between an equal chance (0; 5 euros) 
lottery (i.e., 2.5 euros expected gain) and a safe choice, increasing from 0.50 cents to 5 euros in 
increments of 0.50 cents. Under the expected utility assumption, the number of times an individual 
chooses the safe choice is a measure of his or her risk aversion. The computer will draw one row at 
random, and the subject will receive the payment for this row in cash at the end of the experiment. We 
converted the number of safe choices into an index, with 1 for the maximum risk aversion.  
Several scholars have used variants of the modified dictator game to elicit aversion to favorable 
inequality (e.g., Balafoutas et al., 2012; He and Villeval, 2017; Vranceanu and Dubart, 2019).
6
 The 
dictator must make binary choices among various payoff distributions with a multiple price list 
structure; the rows vary the benefit of the dictator in an unequal allocation, who must weight it against 
a lower benefit for him or her in an equal allocation. In this paper, we adopt a different-but-related 
variant of the dictator game to measure the general rate of substitution of the dictator between the sum 
(efficiency) and variance (inequality) of a gift to a pair of anonymous persons. This approach often 
gauges the dictator’s general preference for fairness relative to efficiency. 
                                                     
6
 In the standard dictator game, an active player (the dictator) is paired at random with a passive player and is 
given the choice of how to share his or her endowment. The latter takes no other action, he or she is a passive 
player. 
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To elicit this special form of inequality aversion, we asked the participants how they would 
allocate a sum of money to two other agents, chosen at random from the participant pool.
7
 At the end 
of the experiment, the computer draws one line at random and implements the chosen allocation, and 
two participants matched at random with agent 1 will receive the payment in cash. The task is 
presented in Table 3.  
 Allocation Please chose Allocation 
Nb. 
row 
Player 
A 
Player 
B 
left right Player 
A 
Player 
B 
1 0 0 □ □ 5 0 
2 0.50 0.50 □ □ 5 0 
3 1.0 1.0 □ □ 5 0 
4 1.5 1.5 □ □ 5 0 
5 2.0 2.0 □ □ 5 0 
6 2.5 2.5 □ □ 5 0 
7 3.0 3.0 □ □ 5 0 
Table 3. The inequality aversion task 
The number of times the individual choses the equalitarian distribution (left) is a good measure 
of his or her preference for equality relative to efficiency, or, in this special context, inequality 
aversion. This score has also been converted into an index, with 1 as the maximum inequality 
aversion. 
In both these multiple price list choices, subjects with transitive preferences must switch at most 
once from one option to the other. When “inconsistent” subjects switch more than once, we consider 
these observations to be missing variables. 
The participants had to complete the questionnaire by Northouse (2011) including 18 items to 
identify three common styles of leadership: autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire leadership (see the 
Instructions in the Appendix). The intensity of the preference for each of these tendencies was also 
expressed as 0-1 indices. 
The subjects were also asked to indicate their age, gender, and admission track. 
Immediately after the decision task (and after learning their payoffs), the employees were asked 
to report their satisfaction with respect to the outcome of Agent 1’s decision on a scale from 1 (very 
unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). 
2. The results 
Appendix Table A1 presents the characteristics of the subject sample, overall and by the subjects’ 
roles (318 agent 2s and 3s (employees) and 159 agent 1s (managers)). The subject characteristics are 
evenly distributed across the two types of agents, confirming the quality of the randomization. 
                                                     
7
 We ensure that one player is matched with two other distinct players. 
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In this first part of the text, the analysis will focus on the choices of the managers, or Agent 1s, 
in our notation. As we already mentioned above, the main treatments differ as to whether the manager 
is obliged to disclose the payoffs associated with each option and whether the employees can retaliate 
by imposing a costly sanction on the manager. The main treatments and the distribution of the 
participants in the role of managers by treatment are presented in Table 2. 
As mentioned above, the essential decision of the manager is the payoff distribution; more 
precisely, he or she must choose between Option A (4; 4; 4) and Option B (6; 8 or 2; 2 or 8). The first 
option is egalitarian but Pareto inefficient, and the second is inegalitarian but efficient. Furthermore, 
the manager has a direct incentive to choose the efficient allocation B insofar as his or her direct gain 
is larger, and the would-be sanction cannot exceed 2 euros. 
In our data, the participants preferred the egalitarian option, which was chosen 53.46% 
(85/159) of the time whereas the efficient option was implemented 46.54% (71/159) of the time. 
Several sociologists have criticized business school education for its alleged emphasis on 
“managerialism”, i.e., a nurtured bias for efficiency at the expense of any other socially valuable goals 
(Khurana, 2007; Parker, 2018). Our results do not support this claim. 
What prompts the manager to choose the efficient decision? 
The data in Table 4 show that if the employees could punish the manager in a last move, the 
latter will more likely choose the egalitarian option whereas the reverse occurs if there are no 
sanctions (Pearson chi-squared: 5.30; p=0.02). The threat of the sanction thus supports the egalitarian 
choice. In other words, regardless of their own preferences over the two allocations, managers are 
prompted to choose the egalitarian option because they believe that ex-post workers prefer the 
equalitarian distribution. 
In the no-sanction condition, the equalitarian Option A is still chosen in 40% of the cases, and 
this frequency rises to 60% in the with-sanction case. 
 
 
 Option A Option B Total 
Sanction not allowed N 21 31 52 
  % 40.38 59.62 100.00  
Sanction allowed N 64 43 107 
  % 59.81 40.19 100.00  
Total N 85 74 159 
  % 53.46 46.54 100.00  
Table 4. Number and frequency of times Option A (B) is chosen, by sanction condition 
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However, when allowed, sanctions were applied only in a very small number of cases. 
Sanctions can be applied by 214 subjects (employees in the with-sanction case); they were 
implemented in only 12 cases, or 5.6% (among whom 9 subjects received the low 2-euro payoff). 
As shown in Table 5, when managers cannot hide information (full information condition), they 
more often tend to choose the inegalitarian option B, which is not statistically significant (Pearson chi-
squared: 1.91; p=0.17). The only explanation for this counterintuitive result lies in the fact that in the 
hide information condition, many managers choose to disclose all information and then choose the 
egalitarian option A. This preference for honesty or transparency is a positive characteristic of future 
managers, with the caveat that these are generalized results based on a population of students in 
management school compared to a population of actual managers. 
 
 
. Option 
A  Option B Total 
Asymmetric information  Nb 54 39 93 
 
% 58.06 41.94 100.00  
Full information Nb 31 35 66 
 
% 46.97 53.03 100.00  
Total Nb 85 74 159 
 
% 53.46 46.54 100.00  
Table 5. Number and frequency of times Option A (B) is chosen, by information condition 
 
In this experiment, we did not explicitly model the shareholders’ behavior or how they exert 
control over the manager to ensure that they pursue the goal of efficiency. However, this fundamental 
relationship is implicit in the payoff structure of the manager, the latter being “incentivized” by his or 
her higher gain in the efficient option B.  
In the following, we are interested in the “micro-foundations” of the decision; more precisely, 
we seek to understand how the choice of the efficient option A is related to elements of the context and 
the personal characteristics of the player, going beyond pure monetary gain. 
Table 6 presents the results of several OLS regression models where the dependent variable is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the manager chose Option B and 0 otherwise.
8
  
The explanatory variables are as follows: A dummy variable, Full information, takes the value 
of 1 in the condition in which the manager cannot hide information and 0 otherwise. Another 
condition dummy, Sanction allowed, takes the value of 1 if the employees can punish the manager and 
0 otherwise. 
                                                     
8
 A probit model delivers similar results. 
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We create three dummy variables for the process used for this decision; each takes the value of 
1 if the process was “explain and decide”, “listen and decide”, “majority vote,” respectively. Because 
one subject must use one of these processes, these three variables are not independent; therefore, we 
use the first as the benchmark.  
The dummy Hide option B takes the value of 1 if managers choose to hide this inegalitarian 
option, conditional upon having this possibility. Another dummy (Eco track) takes the value of 1 if the 
subject had economics as the admission track. Other variables are the risk aversion and inequality 
aversion scores (continuous, 0 to 1) as well as the three scores of the Northouse scale of managerial 
styles. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Full information=1 0.196** 0.104* 0.252**  
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11)    
Sanction allowed=1 -0.239*** -0.222*** -0.190*** 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)    
Listen and decide 0.076 0.089 0.071    
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)    
Majority vote 0.068 0.101 0.048    
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)    
Female=1 -0.008 0.060 0.059    
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Age -0.019* -0.021 -0.021    
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
FiliereEco=1 -0.079 -0.034 -0.062    
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)    
Risk aversion 
 
-0.294 -0.165    
  
(0.21) (0.20)    
Inequality aversion 
 
-0.548*** -0.460*** 
  
(0.13) (0.14)    
Style autocratic 
 
-0.010 -0.003    
  
(0.01) (0.01)    
Style democratic 
 
-0.033* -0.032*   
  
(0.02) (0.02)    
Style laissez-faire 
 
0.020 0.026*   
  
(0.01) (0.01)    
Hide option B=1 
  
0.334**  
   
(0.14)    
Constant 0.935*** 1.905*** 1.431*** 
 
(0.27) (0.40) (0.45)    
r2 0.077 0.205 0.257    
N 159 137 137 
Legend: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%; (s.e.) within 
parentheses. OLS, errors clustered by session 
Table 6. Choice of option B (efficient) 
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As expected, the degree of inequality aversion of the manager is an important factor in 
explaining why the latter would avoid option B. However, even if controlling for his or her social 
preferences, managers more often choose option B in the full information setting; however, when they 
hide option B (in the asymmetric information setting), opportunities to implement it will increase. As 
shown above, the threat of sanction dissuades managers from choosing Option B.  
No decision process seems to back option B more than option A. The managerial styles have a 
weak impact. Managers with a democratic leadership orientation tend to prefer option A, and laissez-
faire managers tend to prefer option B, which is in line with intuitive reasoning. 
When managers can hide information, which communication strategy do they 
adopt? 
We now study the choices of the 93 managers in the asymmetric information condition (with 
and without sanctions). Recall that, in this condition, only the manager knows the payoffs associated 
with the two options and can decide whether to disclose the payoff of option A, of option B or of both 
options (fully transparent). 
Table 7 shows that there is a neat difference in communication strategy – those who hide B will 
likely implement B; those who hide A, or disclose both, will likely choose A (Pearson chi-squared 
26.64; p<0.01). The “transparent” manager will choose the egalitarian option, and the “opaque” one 
will rather choose the inegalitarian one. 
 
 
 
Disclose both 
Hide 
A Hide B Total 
Option A N 36 5 13 54 
 
% 85.71 45.45 32.50 58.06  
Option B N 6 6 27 39 
 
% 14.29 54.55 67.50 41.94  
Total N 42 11 40 93 
 
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 7: Communication strategy in asymmetric information condition by option 
 
From Table 8, we note that “listen and decide” is the preferred process of the managers in the 
asymmetric information condition, regardless of the communication strategy.  
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 Disclose both  Hide A Hide B Total 
Explain and decide N 8 2 3 13 
 
% 19.05 18.18 7.50 13.98 
Listen and decide N 27 7 25 59 
 
% 64.29 63.64 62.50 63.44 
Majority vote N 7 2 12 21 
 
% 16.67 18.18 30.00 22.58 
Total N 42 11 40 93 
 
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 8: Communication strategy in asymmetric information condition by process 
 
We now further investigate the driver of the choice to hide B in the asymmetric information 
condition (40 out of 93 subjects). 
Regression analysis (Table 9), using the dummy hide option B =1 and 0 otherwise as a 
dependent variable, reveals that subjects with a strong inequality aversion will avoid hiding B; this 
finding is consistent with the previous observation that agents who implement option A will adopt the 
transparent communication strategy. The nature of the decision process is not significant; however, 
managerial styles have a small influence, with the autocratic and laissez-faire managers being less 
prone to use the information manipulation strategy, probably for different reasons. As expected, the 
coefficient of risk aversion is negative and statistically significant. Possibly, the risk-averse managers 
have an amplified perception of the punishment threat, which will temper their desire to pass on option 
B. 
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model 1 model 2 model 3 
Sanction allowed -0.201 -0.159 -0.150    
  
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15)    
Listen and decide 
 
0.136 0.098 0.061    
 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.22)    
Majority vote  0.238 0.217 0.195    
  
(0.22) (0.26) (0.23)    
Female=1 
 
0.034 0.012 0.003    
  
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)    
Age 
 
-0.011 -0.004 -0.000    
  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)    
FiliereEco -0.029 0.126 0.142    
  
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11)    
Risk aversion 
 
-0.620*** -0.607*** 
   
(0.12) (0.14)    
Inequality aversion 
 
-0.408* -0.503*** 
   
(0.18) (0.15)    
Autocratic 
  
-0.040*   
    
(0.02)    
Democratic 
  
-0.006    
    
(0.03)    
Laissez-faire 
  
-0.032*   
    
(0.01)    
_cons 
 
0.601 1.018 2.416*   
  
(1.15) (1.09) (1.07)    
r2 
 
0.076 0.193 0.293    
N 
 
93 79 79 
Legend: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%; (s.e) within 
parentheses. OLS, errors clustered by session. 
Table 9: Factors determining the choice of hiding option B 
A further investigation of the choice of the decision process 
Recall that, in this study, managers can choose to either make a discretionary decision after sending 
employees some brief information or monitor a brief chat among the employees and then decide or 
implement a voting mechanism where the option that obtains at least 50% of the votes is implemented. 
The data in Table 10 show the frequency of using one of the three processes, overall and 
depending on the option chosen. The most preferred process is the second (59.75%).  
We found little correlation between the choice of option B and the type of process (Pearson chi-
squared=1.18, p=0.55). The data suggest that the discretionary process (explain and decide) might be 
weakly associated with option A. 
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 Explain and 
decide 
Listen and 
decide 
Majority 
vote Total 
Option A N 17 49 19 85 
 
% 20.00 57.65 22.35 100.00  
Option B N 10 46 18 74 
 
% 13.51 62.16 24.32 100.00  
Total N 27 95 37 159 
 
% 16.98 59.75 23.27 100.00  
Table 10: Use of decision process by option to be implemented 
Quite intriguingly, when no sanction is possible, the managers will resort less to the 
discretionary process and relatively more to the participative processes, which is to some extent 
counterintuitive (Pearson chi-square=7.16, p=0.03). 
 
 Explain and 
decide 
Listen and 
decide 
Majority 
vote Total 
Sanction not allowed N 3 34 15 52 
 
% 5.77 65.38 28.85 100.00  
Sanction allowed N 24 61 22 107 
 
% 22.43 57.01 20.56 100.00  
Total N 27 95 37 159 
 
% 16.98 59.75 23.27 100.00  
Table 11: Use of decision process by possibility of retaliation 
 
We also estimate three regression with three distinct dependent variables: dummies 1/0 for each 
choice of process – explain and decide (discretion) (1/0), listen and decide (1/0), majority vote (1/0). 
The output of these regressions presented in Appendix Table A2 reveals that none of the elements of 
our analysis (contextual factors, personal characteristics) can explain the choice of process. 
We now study whether the manager who implements the listen and decide process (he or she 
monitored the chat exchange before making his or her decision) implemented the consensus of the two 
“employees”. As mentioned above, the chat was recorded so we could read it and determine whether 
players 2 and 3 reached a consensus for option A or for option B, or they reached no agreement (we 
manually coded the three outcomes). It turns out that when a consensus was reached, most of the time, 
the manager followed it (Pearson chi-squared = 25.2; p<0.01). This would suggest that managers 
chose the listen and decide process when they were unsure of what to do yet wanted to retain full 
control with regard to the decision. Otherwise, they would adopt the vote procedure that also favored 
the consensus of the employees but partly removes his or her control. 
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 No 
consensus 
Consensus for 
option A 
Consensus 
for option B Total 
Option A N 19 27 3 49 
 
% 38.78  55.10 6.12 100.00  
Option B N 18 7 21 46 
 
% 39.13       15.22 45.65 100.00  
Total N 37 34 24 95 
 
% 38.95       35.79 25.26 100.00 
Table 12: Choice of option in the listen and decide process by consensus of the group 
Finally, we analyze the outcome of the decision process considering the perspective of the employees, 
i.e., agents 2 and 3. 
Who is the happiest employee? 
Recall that, at the end of the experiment, the subjects in the employee role (318 subjects) could use a 
scale from 1 to 5 to express their satisfaction with the outcome of the experiment, with 1 for extremely 
discontented to 5 for extremely satisfied.
9
 
Unsurprisingly, the most satisfied participant is the one who earns the most. However, the 
relationship between payoffs and satisfaction is nonlinear as shown in Table 13. If earning 2 euros is 
associated with a low satisfaction level (a statistically significant difference from earning 4 euros), the 
satisfaction of earning 8 euros is almost close to that of earning 4 euros. This low difference is 
probably not only the outcome of a concave utility function; in line with the standard social preference 
assumption, the winners of the large payoff might attach some disutility to the gap between their large 
gain (8 euros) and the lo gain (2 euros) of their partner. 
 
Payoff Satisfaction s.e. [95% conf. Interval] 
2 euros 2.59 (0.16) 2.28 2.90 
4 euros 4.06 (0.10) 3.88 4.24 
8 euros 4.40 (0.12) 4.16 4.63 
Table 13: Satisfaction level of agent 2 and 3 by end-of-experiment payoff 
 
Table 13 presents the results of regression models with satisfaction as the dependent variable. 
They confirm that the payoff is the most important explanatory variable. The process used to 
implement the decision has no impact on the satisfaction.
10
 Furthermore, controlling for profit, the 
employees truly do not appreciate having option B hidden, which the managers seemed to dismiss as 
they often used this possibility. 
                                                     
9
 In some treatments, they could also impose a sanction; however, as we mentioned, the monetary sanction was 
imposed in only very few occurrences. 
10
 We also checked and found that the choice of the process does not matter for the subset of players who earn 
the low payoff (2 euros). 
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A somewhat unexpected result is that the subjects with a high aversion to inequality appear to 
be happier (while controlling for their gains). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Payoff (2, 4, 8) 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.260*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Sanction allowed = 1 0.192 0.105 0.122 0.045 0.030 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Full information = 1 -0.038 0.068 -0.245* -0.114 -0.216 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.22) 
Listen and decide = 1 0.148 0.108 0.181 0.151 0.179 
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) 
Majority vote = 1 0.058 0.179 0.133 0.252 0.258 
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) 
Female = 1 0.080 -0.124 0.057 -0.135 -0.167 
 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) 
Age 0.059* 0.082** 0.062* 0.085** 0.070 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Risk aversion 0.412 
 
0.463 0.517 
  
(0.55) 
 
(0.55) (0.58) 
Inequality aversion 0.814* 
 
0.790* 0.845** 
  
(0.41) 
 
(0.41) (0.39) 
Hide option B = 1 
  
-0.523** -0.460** -0.494** 
   
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
Style autocratic 
   
-0.002 
     
(0.03) 
Style democratic 
   
0.059 
     
(0.04) 
Style laissez-faire 
   
0.034 
     
(0.03) 
Constant 1.116 0.261 1.283 0.361 -1.198 
 
(1.00) (1.10) (1.04) (1.13) (1.24) 
r2 0.156 0.193 0.176 0.208 0.228 
N 318 257 318 257 256 
Legend: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%; (s.e) within parentheses. OLS, errors clustered by 
session 
Table 14: The employee satisfaction equation 
3. Conclusion 
Despite the frequent calls by management and strategy scholars for a more active application of 
experimental methods to the analysis of managerial situations, progress in the field has been relatively 
slow. This hardly comes as a surprise given the substantial distance between the extremely complex 
reality of management and the methodological constraints of the experimental research, which 
generally requires keeping complexity at low levels. 
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In this experiment, we strived to obtain a reasonable compromise between the requirements of 
external and internal validity. We studied an elementary-yet-fundamental choice between efficiency 
and equality, as applied to a payoff allocation among three agents, one “manager” who is in charge of 
the decision and two “employees” who are exposed to the consequences of the decision. In some 
treatments, the latter can retaliate against an unsatisfactory decision, which brings a strategic 
dimension to the relationship between the two types of agents. The experiment elicits those personal 
characteristics that are important for economic decision making: aversion to risk, aversion to 
inequality and management style. Allowing for contextual differences allows the manager to 
manipulate the information he or she delivers to the employees and the process through which the 
decision is implemented. This approach acknowledges that the three elements should be analyzed in 
an integrated way as noted in the introduction (Figure 1). 
In this experiment, the negative results teach us about managerial decision making as much as 
the positive results. The prevalence of the egalitarian decision came as a surprise; the inequality 
aversion of the participants explains this result, but not fully; the managers not only prefer the 
egalitarian distribution, but they also believe that the decision-bearers (employees) also do so; thus, 
they will implement it more often when employees can retaliate. 
While all the three decision processes (discretionary, listen and decide, voting) were used, the 
analysis did not reveal any pattern of choice in the process. Only further research will be able to 
determine whether the participants allowed their inspiration to be based on the “art” component of 
management or whether the experiment failed to capture one important rationale. Furthermore, 
managerial styles as captured by the traditional self-declared survey question had only a modest 
influence on the choice of the option. 
When the managers can hide some of the payoff information, interestingly, the managers who 
implement the egalitarian option tend to be “transparent”, i.e., they fully disclose the payoff 
information; however, the managers who implement the efficient inegalitarian decision tend to conceal 
it. A satisfaction analysis reveals that the employees express significant dissatisfaction with this 
strategic manipulation of information, which raises the question of why the managers implemented 
this strategy in the first place. 
Some of the assumptions used to build the experiment might have been too restrictive. Keeping 
the same design, it would be interesting to see a study of whether “real” managers make different 
choices compared to our sample of young business students. Other payoff distributions can also be 
considered; future studies could set a stronger incentive for managers to implement the efficient 
allocation, in line with the ubiquitous performance pay systems for managers in real companies. 
Despite these limitations, this paper should be seen as an attempt to bring to the lab economic 
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decision-making with a managerial flavor and thus contribute to the nascent literature in behavioral 
management research.  
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Online Appendix 
A. Instructions in brief: the “full information with sanction treatment”11 
 
Slide 1 
Good morning, 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
In this experiment, which should last approximately 30 minutes, you can earn money. It is important 
to carefully read the instructions because the gains will depend on your decisions. 
The main experiment includes three tasks. For each task, you will receive specific instructions. These 
instructions indicate the decisions you can make and how your gains are related to the decisions of the 
participants. Each task is remunerated. 
The total gain will be paid in cash at the end of the session. 
Your choices are strictly anonymous. No other participant will know your decisions or your identity. 
You will receive all instructions on the screen, and you will make your decision on the computer 
screen. 
From now on, please do not communicate in other way than allowed by the instructions. Stay focused 
and turn off your cellular phone; otherwise, you will be asked to leave the room. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for the Administrator. 
 
Slide 2 
In this task, you will be assigned to a group of 3 anonymous participants, selected at random. They are 
denoted agent 1, agent 2 and agent 3. The roles will be assigned at random at the outset of the 
experiment. 
Agent 1 must choose between Option A and Option B. The related payoffs are indicated in the table 
below. 
In option A, agent 1 obtains 4 euros; in option B, agent 1 obtains 6 euros. 
                                                     
11
 In the Asymmetric information situation, the agents know that there are two options, A and B, with payoffs 
(a1, a2, a3) and (b1, b2, b3). Agent 1 is the only one who knows the true monetary payoffs. In a first step, he or 
she must decide whether to disclose some or all information about the payoffs. 
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Agents 2 and 3 will be paid depending on the decision of player 1 and a random drawing. If agent 1 
chooses option A, both agents receive 4 euros. If player 1 chooses option B, agent 2 receives 8 euros 
and agent 2 gets 2 euros with a probability 0.5, and agent 2 receives 2 euros and agent 3 receives 8 
euros with probability 0.5. 
Option A Option B 
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 
4 4 4 6 2/8* 8/2* 
Legend * - Probability 0.5 to get the low/high payoff 
 
Agent 1 can implement his or her decision using one of the following decision processes: 
 Process 1. Agent 1 can use a chat box to send a message to agents 2 and 3, then chose 
option A or B 
 Process 2. Agent 1 allows agents 2 and 3 to chat with respect to their preferences for 
one of the options. He or she monitors the chat without intervening, then decides by 
him- or herself which of Option A or B he or she will implement. 
 Process 3. Agent 1 informs agents 2 and 3 that the decision will be the outcome of a 
majority vote involving the three of them. The percent of votes in favor of the majority 
option is not disclosed. 
Once the Option is chosen, all participants are informed about their payoffs.  
Finally, agents 2 and 3 can, if they wish, impose a sanction on agent 1, for an amount between 0 and 2 
euros. Each euro of sanction will cost the agent 0.25 cents. 
Do you have any questions before continuing? If so, please raise your hand and wait for the 
administrator. 
 
Slide 3 a – Task 1: decision agent 1 
You are agent 1. 
You must choose between these two allocations. The gains for each player associated with each option 
are presented in the Table below (the same as above). 
What process do you want to implement? 
- 1 I send a message to the two players, then choose the option 
- 2 I allow them to chat and monitor their exchanges without intervening, then I choose the 
option 
- 3 I implement a majority vote decision process.  
I choose the process [...] 
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Slide 3b – Task 1: decision agents 2 and 3 
You are agent 2 (or 3). 
[Depending on the process, they receive one of the messages and required actions] 
Agent 1 / sent you this message ……. He or she will decide which of option A or B to implement. 
Or 
You can exchange by chat during 2 minutes with your partner about your preferences on these two 
allocations. Agent 1 will monitor the exchange but cannot intervene. He will then determine which of 
option A or B to implement. 
Or 
Agent 1 decided to implement a voting procedure. The three of you will cast a vote in favor of one of 
the two options. The option that receives the majority of votes will be implemented. 
 
Slide 4. Agent 1 
I choose / vote for option A / B 
 
Slide 5 
Results – Your gain from this task is: …  
[Only for players 2 and 3] 
Do you want to impose a sanction on agent 1 ? Y/N 
Amount (…) (max 2 euros) 
Your net gain for this first task is: .. 
 
The complementary tasks for eliciting risk aversion and the preference for equality relative to 
efficiency were presented in the main text. These tasks were incentivized. 
Last, the participants were asked to indicate on 5-item scales their agreement with each of these 
statements (from 1 = total disagreement to 5 = full agreement).
12
 
1. Employees must be supervised closely, or they are unlikely to do their work. 
 
                                                     
12
 From Northouse (2011). Scoring: sum the responses on items 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16 to gauge 
authoritarian leadership; sum the responses on items 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17 to gauge democratic 
leadership; sum the responses on items 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 to gauge laissez-faire leadership. 
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2. Employees want to be part of the decision-making process. 
 
3. In complex situations, leaders should let subordinates work problems out on their own. 
 
4. It is fair to say that most employees in the general population are lazy. 
 
5. Providing guidance without pressure is the key to being a good leader. 
 
6. Leadership requires staying out of the way of subordinates as they do their work. 
 
7. As a rule, employees must be given rewards or punishments to motivate them to achieve 
organizational objectives. 
 
8. Most workers want frequent and supportive communication from their leaders. 
 
9. As a rule, leaders should allow subordinates to appraise their own work. 
 
10. Most employees feel insecure about their work and need direction. 
 
11. Leaders must help subordinates accept responsibility for completing their work. 
 
12. Leaders should give subordinates complete freedom to solve problems on their own. 
 
13. The leader is the chief judge of the achievements of the members of the group. 
 
14. It is the leader’s job to help subordinates find their “passion.” 
 
15. In most situations, workers prefer little input from their leader. 
 
16. Leaders give orders and clarify procedures.  
 
17. People are basically competent, and if given a task, they will do a good job. 
 
18. In general, it is best to leave subordinates alone.  
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B. Summary statistics and addition regressions 
  Gender Age Filiere Risk 
av. 
Ineq. 
av. 
Autocratic Democratic Laissez-
faire 
Employees N 318 318 318 284 282 317 317 317 
 Mean 1.53 20.42 0.53 0.55 0.55 17.60 22.90 17.77 
 s.d. 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.19 
Managers N 159 159 159 143 147 159 159 159 
 Mean 1.45 20.48 0.58 0.55 0.54 18.14 22.60 17.65 
 s.d. 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.22 0.26 
Total N 477 477 477 427 429.00 476 476 476 
 Mean 1.50 20.44 0.55 0.55 0.55 17.78 22.80 17.73 
 s.d. 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.15 
Table A1. The personal characteristics of the subjects, by role played in the experiment 
 
 
Explain and 
decide = 1 
Listen and 
decide =1 
Majority vote 
=1 
Sanction allowed =1  0.187** -0.017 -0.170 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) 
Full information = 1 0.083 -0.043 -0.040 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.09) 
Option B=1 -0.059 0.030 0.029 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
Female =1 -0.099 0.009 0.090 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
Age 0.006 -0.033*** 0.027* 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Style autocratic -0.003 0.007 -0.004 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Style democratic 0.004 0.012 -0.016 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Style laissez faire -0.017 0.002 0.015 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Ineq. aversion  0.192 -0.224 0.032 
 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
Risk aversion -0.332* 0.138 0.194 
 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant 0.415 0.885** -0.300 
 
(0.64) (0.35) (0.49) 
r2 0.105 0.040 0.069 
N 137 137 137 
Legend: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%; (s.e.) within parentheses. Std errors clustered 
by session 
Table A2: The determinants of the type of decision process 
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